Abstract
Hobbes’s justification for original maternal dominion is often evaluated in connection to the ambiguous status of women in his political thought. Many feminist interpreters explain this ambiguity as a contradiction: following Carole Pateman, they see maternal dominion as one term of the “paradox of parental power.” The first aim of this article is to elaborate a second, alternative approach within some critical responses to Pateman’s reading. Rather than as one part of a contradiction, in these interpretations maternal dominion emerges as a self-standing form of authority that is very different from patriarchal domination. By offering a new synthesis of some of these interpretations, I aim to show this second view as more comprehensive and compelling than that offered by Pateman. Then, building upon this view, I give a new reading of the concept of preservation that establishes the mother’s dominion as an intersubjective practice that reflects an awareness about the interdependent conditions for human well-being and, hence, challenges the standard approach to Hobbesian individualism and sovereign power. Finally, drawing from my interpretation of preservation, I offer a new way to understand Hobbes’s argument that “parental authority is derived from the child’s consent.”

Chapter Abstract
This chapter explores the relations between musical instruments, performance, sociality, and well-being by drawing upon Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. In-passing, Borgmann categorizes musical instruments as “focal things.” He does not consider the implications of this characterization; this chapter does. Borgmann does not place musical performance in the associated category, “focal practice”; this chapter does. Among the benefits of examining performance and instruments through Borgmann’s framework, we are given the conceptual tools for understanding just how some technologies make a positive contribution to performance (in terms of what the author calls “technological paraphernalia”) and just how other technologies threaten the focal practice of performance (what Borgmann calls “technological devices”). More broadly, Borgmann has a unique way of articulating what it is to treat performance and instruments as ends in themselves rather than as means. Through this articulation, we see that performance and instruments can contribute to a good life through what Borgmann calls “centering.”